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SOME COMMENTS OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER
SECTION 77B OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT*
By AUSTIN V CLIFFORD

(A)

THE SCOPE OF THE PAPER

When Judge Gause asked me to prepare this paper on
Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, he said that he wanted
it to be strictly a professional paper. I understood that to
mean that, in view of the tremendous amount of current legal
material on the subject, and the length of time allotted to
this paper, it would be out of place for me to discuss the
history, purpose, and constitutionality of the Act, or to give
any detailed consideration as to the various steps which are
undertaken in the course of a reorganization as a matter
of routine, and that what really was desired was a discussion
of some of the current decisions on interesting and debatable
points of law arising in proceedings under 77B, with special
reference to decisions which may have a local application.
At the outset, I want to plead guilty to over-simplification
throughout the paper. It is obviously impossible to refer to
all of the qualifications and exceptions which a statute, as
broad in scope as Section 77B, must contain, in order to cover
all cases. If those qualifications and exceptions were continually referred to, it would be impossible to follow the main
trend of thought. The most that can be attempted now is to
point out in rather broad outlines the way the law is developing in certain principal categories under Section 77B, as
follows
first, the method of invoking jurisdiction, second,
questions that arise between the approval of the petition for
reorganization and the approval of the plan, and third, the
plan of reorganization and how it is proposed and approved.
°Address by Austin V Clifford, of the'Indianapolis Bar, at the Mid-Winter
Meeting of the Indiana State Bar Association, February 1, 1936.
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(B)

THE METHOD OF INVOKING JURISDICTION

Broadly speaking, Section 77B has greatly enlarged the
scope of the Bankruptcy Act, for corporations may file under
it which are not insolvent within the definition of that word
given in Section 1 of the Bankruptcy Act. It is only necessary
for the corporation filing under the Act to be insolvent in the
old common law sense, that is, unable to pay its debts as they
mature in the usual course of business (subsection (a))!J
Many a corporation may have a substantial excess of assets
over liabilities and a future of considerable promise, and still
at certain periods be unable to meet its debts as they fall due
in the usual course of business. Valuable equities in such
corporations may often be saved by resort to Section 77B.
It is interesting to note in this connection, however, that a
corporation may voluntarily file under Section 77B, although
it is insolvent in the bankruptcy definition of the word, that is,
the aggregate of its assets at a fair valuation is less than the
aggregate of its indebtedness. [Sec. 1, Sec. 77B, subsection
(a)]. This means that a corporation which has no equity
in its property still has such an interest in continued existence
that it may seek the protection of the statute, even though
the stockholders of that corporation may be entirely eliminated
in the reorganization and an entirely new set of stockholders,
consisting of creditors of the corporation prior to reorganization, become the owners of the corporation's property after
the reorganization proceedings have been completed.1 Thus,
in Re Central Funding Corp.,2 it was held that, after a decree
had been entered dissolving the corporation, the bondholders
might petition for a reorganization which consisted only, in
essence, of an exchange of their bonds for participation certificates in a successor liquidating corporation. And in Re 211
East Delaware Place Building Corp.,3 a corporation dissolved for non-payment of franchise taxes was reorganized
for the benefit of bondholders.
1 In re Broadway-Exchange Corporation, C. C. H. Bankruptcy Service,
Decisions Volume, Paragraph 3696.
2 75 Fed. (2d) 256, (2 C. C. A.)

a76 Fed. (2d) 834, (2 C. C. A.)
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Involuntary petitions may be filed by three or more cred.
itors holding provable claims in the aggregate, in excess of
the value of securities of $1,000. Likewise, three or more
creditors possessing the same qualifications may contest the
voluntary petition of the debtor. Stockholders holding S%
in number of all outstanding shares of stock of any class of
the debtor corporation may contest the petition of creditors.
In this connection, a recent decision of the Circuit Court
of Appeals of the 7th Circuit is of particular interest to attorneys in this state. All Indiana lawyers are familiar with
the widespread practice in this state of financing real estate
projects by means of preferred stock. Most of such corporations own the fee of certain real estate and do not have large
amounts of creditors in proportion to the value of the real
estate. However, during the depression, practically all of
those corporations have defaulted in the payment of dividends
on preferred stock and maturities of preferred stock. A
particularly interesting question is whether corporations
whose preferred stock is in default may be reorganized under
Section 77B. In the Piccadilly Realty Company case, 4 the
corporation owned an apartment and store building having an
assessed valuation of $127,640, had cash on hands of approximately $6,500, and accounts receivable in the amount of
$1,100. It owed approximately $4,000 of taxes, $1,756
of debts, $6,600 for the services of the common stockholder,
and the costs and expenses of administration which had
accrued in state court receivership proceedings. The preferred stock having been in default since August 1, 1931,
the preferred stockholders held a special meeting, purported
to exercise the voting rights conferred upon them in event
of default, and elected a new Board of Directors, who thereupon chose new officers and authorized the new officers to file
proceedings for the reorganization of the company under
Section 77B. This was done. The District Court approved
the filing of the petition. On appeal, the Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court. In its
opinion, the Circuit Court of Appeals referred specially to
4 78 Fed. (2d) 257.
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subsection (b) 10, which contains the words
"The term
'claims' includes debts, securities, other than stock, liens, or
other interests of whatever character"
Relying upon the
case of Star Publishing Co. v. Ball,5 the Court said that preferred stockholders, whatever their stipulated preferences
might be, were nevertheless not creditors, but parties "to the
business venture along with the common stockholders." Upon
the authority of Allied Magnet IFire Corp. v. Tuttle," the
Court held that. the agreement to pay dividends on the preferred stock was not enforceable where there was no showing
that profits were earned by the business of the corporation out
of which the dividends could be paid. It is to be regretted
that the court did not refer to the recent Appellate Court
opinions in Campbell v. Grant Trust & Savings Co. and in
Cring v. Sheller WFood Rim M fg. Co.,7 which contain some
contrary implications. The Piccadilly case was argued by
able counsel and doubtless both Appellate Court cases were
cited to the Circuit Court of Appeals. However, that court
chose to base its decision strictly upon the wording of Section
77B, rather than on the general principles of corporation law
This case will undoubtedly settle the law for this jurisdiction
that matured preferred stock, in default, cannot be a sufficient
basis for saying that the corporation owes debts which it is
unable to pay in the usual course of business, and means that
most real estate corporations can only be reorganized in
equity proceedings.
After a petition has been filed, the next step is that if the
court is satisfied that the petition complies with this section
and has been filed in good faith, it shall approve the petition.
The court's order made in pursuance of this clause of the
statute is equivalent to the adjudication of bankruptcy under
the Bankruptcy Act itself, and establishes the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over all of the property, wherever located. 8
5 192 Ind. 158, 134 N. E. 285.
6 199 Ind. 166, 154 N. E. 480, 156 N. E. 558.
797 Ind. App. 169, 182 N. E. 267, 98 Ind. App. 310, 183 N. E. 674.
8 Humphrey v. Bankers Mtge. Co., 79 Fed. (2d) 345, (10 C. C. A.),
re Greyling Realty Corp., 74 Fed. (2d) 734, (2 C. C. A.).

In
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Good faith in connection with the filing of a reorganization
proceeding probably means that the petition is filed by properly authorized representatives of the debtor corporation or
by bona fide and qualified creditors, that the jurisdictional
requirements are present; that there is a genuine need for
reorganization9 and that there is no intent by invoking the
proceedings to delay action in a court which is already far
along in the process of reorganizing or liquidating the debtor.
In the Grigsby-Grunow Company reorganization,10 a petition
was filed by three creditors after a sale by a trustee in bankruptcy in liquidating proceedings, but before the actual conveyance of the property by the trustee. The company had
been either in equity receivership or bankruptcy for more than
eleven months, and the District Judge who had jurisdiction
of the case had urged that a reorganization be effected. Bondholders committees and creditors committees had sought to
reorganize without success. Counsel for the petitioners under
Section 77B refused to disclose what their plan of reorganization was, or who would act as financial sponsors of the plan,
though they offered to reveal this in confidence to the Judge
in chambers. The District Judge dismissed the petition as
not brought in good faith, and the Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed that action.
There have been no decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States defining when a petition is filed in good faith.
Four cases involving this point are pending before the Supreme Court upon petition for certiorari, all from the Seventh

Circuit."
For corporations whose property is located in more than
one state or Federal District and whose activities are of wide
scope, Section 77B affords the tremendous advantage of
nation-wide jurisdiction of property 12 No ancillary administrations, with their attendant expense and possible conflicts

of jurisdiction are involved.'8
) In re South Coast Co., 8 Fed. Supp. 43, (D. C. Del.).
1077 Fed. (2d) 200, (7 C. C. A.).
11 U. S. Law Weekly, Dec. 31, 1935, p. 15, Jan. 14, 1936, p. 14.
12

In re Greyling Realty Corp., 74 Fed. (2d) 734, (2 C. C. A.).

13 Sec 23 Georgetown Law Journal 41M.

SECTION 77B OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT

Moreover, if the debtor corporation has a number of subsidiaries, the court may exercise the same jurisdiction to any
subsidiary, its property, creditors and stockholders, as the
court could exercise with respect to the principal debtor, if
the subsidiary files a petition setting forth insolvency, inability
to meet its debts as they mature, or simply a desire to effect
a reorganization with or as a part of the plan of the principal
debtor.
(C)

QUESTIONS ARISING BETWEEN APPROVAL OF PETITION
AND THE APPR6)VAL OF THE REORGANIZATION

PLAN

After approval of the petition, the court may, after a
hearing upon notice to the debtor and to such others as the
court may determine, temporarily continue the debtor in
possession or appoint a trustee or trustees and cause the
debtor or trustee to give such notice as the court deems proper
to creditors and stockholders, and also cause publication
thereof at least once a week for two successive weeks of a time
for hearing to be held within thirty days from the date of the
original order, at which hearing the court may permanently
restore the debtor to possession or appoint a permanent trustee or trustees or additional or substitute trustees. Whether
the debtor remains in possession or not, the court generally
continues the operation of the debtor's business. A nice
question arises in this situation as to what rank the obligations
incurred by the debtor in possession, or by the temporary or
permanent trustee may have with reference to claims of other
creditors of the debtor. It would be reasonable to suppose
that the courts would adopt the analogy to the debts created
by an equity receiver while operating a business under the
supervision of the court, and hold that the debts incurred
subsequent to the entering of the order approving the filing
of the debtor's petition would be paid prior to the general
unsecured indebtedness of the debtor created theretofore.
This result was reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in the case of In re Avorn Dress Co., Inc. 14
1478 Fed. (2d)

681.
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All are familiar with the rule in receivership cases that
persons dealing with a receiver must determine at their peril
the scope of authority granted him by the court. In a subsequent controversy arising in the Avorn Dress Company
case,': the facts were that the debtor, in possession, had borrowed money to meet payrolls without authority from the
court to do so, and had also pledged certain accounts recetvable as security for the loan. The court applied the receivership rule to the situation, refused to recognize the validity of
the pledge, and also refused to permit the lender to be
subrogated to the priority of employees whose wages were
thereby paid.
During this period, the debtor in possession or the trustee,
may, under instructions from the court, reject executory contracts, including leases.'
Of course the rejection of an executory contract other than a lease gives the other contracting
party a general claim against the estate of the debtor for the
amount of the damages sustained.' 7 Likewise, the landlord,
upon the rejection of his lease, is specifically given a claim
for the damages which he may sustain not in excess of the
rent, without acceleration, reserved by the lease for the three
years next succeeding the date of the surrender of the premises
to the landlord or the date of re-entry by the landlord, whichever first occurs, plus unpaid rent accrued up to the date of
such surrender or re-entry
(Subsection (b) 10)
No cases
have been found in which determination of the amount of a
landlord's damages under Section 77B has been discussed.',
It must, of course, be remembered that this provision, which
seems somewhat hard on the landlord, really gives the landlord greater rights against a corporate tenant than he had
under the Bankruptcy Act before Section 77B was enacted.19
15 79 Fed. (2d) 337
10 In re 211 East Delaware etc. Corp., 76 Fed. (2d)

834, (2 C. C. A.),
construing subsection (c)5, In re Cheney Bros., 12 Fed. Supp. 605, (D. C.
Conn.).
17 Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U. S. 581, 60 L.
Ed. 811.
Is Cf. under other provisions of the Bankruptcy Act In re Outfitters
etc. Co., 69 Fed. (2d) 90, (2 C. C. A.).
1) Manhattan Properties Corp v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320, 78 L.
Ed. 824.
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Moreover, if the lease is really an asset of the debtor's estate,
the debtor in possession or the trustee will have to adopt the
lease in order to obtain the benefit of the use of the property
When considering the question of the custody and operation
of the property during the period between the approval of
the filing of the petition and approval of the reorganization
plan, it is interesting to consider the status of property held
by the debtor subject to conditional sales contracts and property of the debtor upon which the debtor has given chattel
mortgages. A recent case decided by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ' ° has held that the machinery
sold to a debtor in New York under conditional sales contracts
which provided that the title to the machinery should remain
in the seller until the machinery was paid for, was not "property" of the debtor within the provisions of Section 77B, and
hence was not part of the subject matter of the reorganization
proceedings. It further held that the seller, when default
occurred in the conditional sales contract, could proceed immediately to repossess the property This result was criticized in a note found in 35 Columbia Law Review 1305 Of
course, exactly the opposite rule has been reached in regard
to the property of the debtor which has been pledged as
security for a debt, or upon which a chattel mortgage has
been given. Wide jurisdiction has been recognized in the
bankruptcy court to restrain action by the pledgee or mortgagee to foreclose the pledge or mortgage lien and thereby
destroy the debtor's equity in the property The leading
case on this subject arose under Section 77, the Railroad
Reorganization Act, and went to the United States Supreme
Court from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.2 1 In that case, a petition for the reorganization of
the Rock Island Railroad was pending under Section 77 of
the Bankruptcy Act. The corporation had issued its notes
secured by mortgage bonds issued by itself and its subsidiaries.
The collateral notes being about to go in default and a sale
In re Lake Laundry, 79 Fed. (2d) 326.
Continental Illinois etc. Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co.,
294- U. S. 648, 79 L. Ed. 1110.
20
21

INDIANA LAIF JOURNAL

being threatened, the debtor filed a petition seeking an injunction against holders of the notes from selling any of the collateral. The holders of the collateral notes, some of them
New York and St. Louis banks, objected to the jurisdiction
of the court over their persons and over the pledged bonds,
and challenged the summary jurisdiction of the court in the
matter The District Court issued an injunction, which action
was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit and by the Supreme Court of the United States. The
Court thus upheld the jurisdiction under Section 77 of an
equity of the debtor corporation in property in the possession
of a third party under an adverse claim. The purpose of
Section 77, the Railroad Reorganization Act, and Section
77B, the general corporate reorganization act, is essentially
the same. In fact, a similar ruling has been made under
22
Section 77B.
The power to stay foreclosure proceedings in mortgages
upon real estate had been exercised under the Bankruptcy Act
before the passage of Section 77B 23 and such jurisdiction has
likewise been exercised under Section 77B, but, after efforts
to reorganize continued over a reasonable time and proved
unsuccessful, the court, having jurisdiction under Section 77B,
has dismissed the petition and permitted the foreclosure to
24
proceed.
During the period immediately following the entering of
the decree approving the filing of the petition, the claims of
all creditors of the debtor must be adjudicated, in order that
their votes in connection with the reorganization plan may
be given the proper weight. In order to speed up the proceedings, Section 77B requires the court to determine a reasonable
time within which the claims and interests of creditors and
stockholders may be filed and to order that no claim or interest
not theretofore filed may participate in the reorganization
plan. The court also has control over the manner in which
such claims or interests may be filed or evidenced and must
22 In re Prudence Bonds Corp., 77 Fed. (2d) 328, (2 C. C. A.).
23 Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318, 75 L. Ed. 1060.
24 In re 235 West 46th Street Co., 74 Fed. (2d) 700, (2 C. C. A.) , In re
Coney Island Hotel Corp., 76 Fed. (2d) 126, (2 C. C. A.).
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classify the various claims in some logical classification which
will enable the court to ascertain the wishes of the various
classes of claimants with respect to their particular interests.
Thus, there may be several different classes of secured creditors. There may be creditors whose security consists of a
mortgage upon the manufacturing plant of the debtor, other
secured creditors whose collateral consists of warehouse receipts for some of the debtor's products, and still another
class of secured creditors whose collateral consists in the
pledge of notes or open accounts of the debtor. The security
of one class of secured creditors may be adequate, that of
another may not be. In such cases, subsection (b)1O specifically provides that the court may, for the purpose of such
classification, classify as an unsecured claim the amount of any
secured claim in excess of the value of the security therefor.
During this same period, the officers of the debtor are usually engaged in formulating a reorganization plan in conjunction with committees representing creditors and stockholders,
or independently, and the culminating steps in the proceeding
under Section 77B turn upon the submission and approval of
the reorganization plan.

(D)

THE REORGANIZATION PLAN AND

How IT Is PROPOSED

AND APPROVED

The essential purpose of proceedings under 77B is the
adoption of a reorganization plan. All of the jurisdiction
and power granted to the court preliminary to the approval
of such plan is for the purpose of enabling the court to clear
away the corporate debris, such as unprofitable executory
contracts and leases, and put the parties in interest in position
to prepare and put into effect a satisfactory plan of reorganization.
The plan may, but need not be proposed at the time of the
filing of the petition. The debtor may propose a plan without
approval by any group of creditors or stockholders. Before
any plan is proposed by others, it must be approved by creditors affected thereby who represent not less than 25% in
amount of any class of creditors and not less than 10o in
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amount of all claims. If the corporation is not insolvent,
but is unable to meet its debts, the plan must be approved,
before it is proposed, by stockholders representing not less
than 10% of any class of stock outstanding, and not less than
5%o of the total number of shares of all classes of stock outstanding. (Subsection (d))
Subsection (b) describes in considerable detail the requirements of a reorganization plan. It requires that the plan
shall provide for payment in cash of all costs of administration
and the allowances made by the court, or reimbursements
ordered by the court under subsection (c) 9 for expenses incurred in connection with the proceedings and the plan by
officers of the debtor, by parties in interest, or by depositories,
committees, etc. It also requires the plan to include such
provisions modifying the rights of any class of creditors as
may be necessary, and permits the plan to modify or alter
the rights of stockholders. Another mandatory provision is
that the plan shall provide for the protection of any class
of creditors or stockholders which, as a class, fails to accept
the reorganization plan (a) by a sale of the property or
equity in which the class is interested at not less than a fair
upset price, or (b) by appraisal and payment in cash of the
value of the interest of the class, or, at the election of the
various members thereof, in securities allotted to such class
under the plan, or (c) by any other method approved by the
court. The reorganization plan must also specify what
classes of creditors or stockholders are not affected thereby,
and what claims, if any, are to be paid in full in cash. The
plan itself may provide for the rejection of executory contracts
and leases. Subsection (b)9 lists a large number of devices
which the plan may include in order to carry the general
purpose of the plan into operation.
It must not be supposed that the foregoing is an exhaustive
analysis of the provisions with respect to the plan. As heretofore stated, the discussion has been over-simplified.
The plan, when proposed, must be submitted to the creditors and stockholders for acceptance. In order to be binding
upon non-assenting parties, the plan must be accepted by
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creditors holding two-thirds in amount of the allowed claims
in each class affected by the plan, and on behalf of stockholders by those holding a majority of the stock of each class.
(Subsection (e) 1) Obviously, if the claims of certain creditors are not affected by the plan, either because, as secured
creditors, they retain the full benefit of their security, or
because, as small current items, they will be paid in full in
cash, it should not be, and is not necessary to secure their
approval to the.plan. As to stockholders, if it is clear that
their interests have been entirely lost, their approving votes
need not be obtained. (Subsection (e) 1) 25
An interesting situation arises where the debtor is a public
utility In such case, subsection (e)2 provides that the plan
shall not be confirmed until it has been submitted to the commission or commissions created by the law of the state or
states in which the debtor's property is located and an opportunity given to such commissions to suggest amendments or
objections to the plan, and that the court shall consider such
objections or amendments at a hearing at which the commission is entitled to be heard. Where the debtor is a public
utility wholly intrastate in character, the same subsection
provides that no plan of reorganization shall be approved,
if the commission certifies that the public interest is affected
by the plan, unless the commission shall fully approve the
plan as to the public interest therein and the fairness thereof.
If the commission does not act within thirty days after submission to it of the proposed plan, or within such additional
period as the bankruptcy court may prescribe, the bankruptcy
court shall consider that the public interest is not affected by
the plan. These provisions, apparently simple, may raise
many practical difficulties, although all of such difficulties
should be capable of solution. The statute apparently contemplates the following sequence first, approval of the plan
by the creditors and stockholders interested in the debtor
utility; second, an opportunity to the commission to be heard
25 In re Continental Cigar Co., C. C. H Bankruptcy Service, New Matters
Division, Paragraph 3652; In re Witherbee Court Corp., C. C. H. Bankruptcy
Service, New Matters Division, Paragraph 3727.
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before the bankruptcy court on such objections or amendments
as it believes should be made to the plan, and third, approval
by the bankruptcy court. The language of subsection (e)2
and (f) is apparently quite clear as to this sequence. In the
only utility reorganization which, so far as is known, has
been completed in this District this simplicity proved to be
theoretical, rather than actual. In that case, the reorganization of the Southern Indiana Telephone Company, the
Public Service Commission took the position that it had two
functions-first, a consideration of the public interest in the
plan, and second, an approval under Section 89 and 91 of
the Shively-Spencer Act,26 of the securities to be issued by
the reorganized corporation-and that it would not enter any
order approving the securities to be issued in accordance with
the plan, unless and until it was assured that the prospective
issuer of the securities would be awarded the utility property
involved in the reorganization. The Judge and the Special
Master at first took the position that, under Section 77B, the
burden was clearly upon the Commission to act before confirmation of the plan by the bankruptcy court. Eventually,
the apparent impasse was solved in this manner A notice,
accompanied by a copy of the reorganization plan, was served
upon the Commission, informing the Commission of the date
on which the hearing on the fairness of the plan would be
held before the Special Master, that date being more than
thirty days from the date of the service of the notice. The
Commission did not appear and object to the plan, and the
Special Master thereupon filed his report approving the plan,
stating that the provisions of subsection (e)2 had been complied with, but pointing out that the approval of the Commission for the issuance of the securities must be obtained before
final confirmation. After the requisite number of days had
elapsed, the Special Master's report was approved by the
court upon the condition that the plan should not become
operative until there should have been filed with the Clerk of
the Court a certified copy of the order of the Public Service
20 Acts

and S.

1933,

General Assembly of Indiana, Chapter 190, Sections 7A
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Commission approving the issuance of the securities contemplated by the plan. This conditional order was presented to
the Public Service Commission which, in due time, issued its
order approving the proposed securities. When the certified
.copy of this order, together with a report by the Trustee of
the proceedings before the public Service Commission, was
filed in the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy court made a
short order to the effect that the plan theretofore conditionally
approved, was now unconditionally approved and put in operation.

27

It seems clear that in this sort of a situation, the Public
Service Commission might cooperate by entering first its
order approving the issuance of the securities contemplated
by the plan, upon condition that the plan is finally approved
bv the Bankruptcy Court. Certainly, one tribunal or the other
must be willing to mold its orders within the scope of its
jurisdiction to permit the situation to be worked out.
It is interesting to speculate on what may happen if the
Public Service Commission should feel that a proposed plan
was inimical to the public interest. In such case, the Commission probably should certify such fact to the Special Master,
with its objections to the plan. The Special Master would
doubtless hear the evidence presented by the security holders,
and by the Public Counsellor in support of the Commission's
objections, and would certify the issue to the District Judge
for decision. Here is a situation which may be fraught with
great difficulty for the members of the Bar, if either the Commission or the Bankruptcy Court adopts an unreasonable and
non-cooperative attitude toward the proposed reorganization.
After the plan has been proposed and accepted, it comes to
the court for confirmation. (Subsection (f))
Strangely
enough, there have not been, to date, any decisions carefully
analyzing the factors which the court will consider controlling
in determining the fairness of the plan. This is the more sur27 See In re Southern Indiana Telephone Co., In Bankruptcy No. 8085-B,
in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division, especially Special Master's 5th Report, order for March
11, 1935, and order for April 16, 1935.
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prising in view of the precedents built up on the equity side
of the Federal Courts in connection with reorganizations
therein. These precedents, starting with the cases of Louts'vilie Trust Co. v. Louisville Railway Co. and Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. Boyd, and running down through National
Surety Co. v. Coriell and First National Bank v. Flershem,28
have analyzed the considerations affecting equity courts in the
approval or rejection of reorganization plans. In general,
the principles laid down in these cases would apply to reorganizations under 77B. 29 In the Coriell and Flershem cases,
the Supreme Court of the United States went all the way
in imposing upon the equity court the affirmative duty of seeing that the reorganization plan adopted was fair. In the
Flershem case, the Supreme Court said
"The failure to secure an adequate price seems to have been due not
to lack of opposing evidence, but to the mistaken belief that it was the
duty of the court to aid in effectuating the plan of reorganization, since
a very large majority of the debenture holders had assented to it.
Moreover, the court stood in a position different from that which it
occupies in ordinary litigation where issues are to be determined solely
upon such evidence as the contending parties choose to introduce. In
receivership proceedings, as was held in National Surety Co. v Coriell,
289 U S. 426, 436, 77 L. Ed. 1300, 1305, every important determination by the court calls for an informed, independent judgment; and
special reasons exist for requiring adequate, trustworthy information
where the jurisdiction rests wholly upon the consent of the defendant
who joins in the prayers for relief. It would be unreasonable to impose
upon a few dissenting creditors the heavy financial burden of making
an adequate appraisal supported by the testimony of competent experts
where, as here, the assets include extensive plants and equipment
located in nine states." (78 L. Ed. at 478).
Does such an affirmative duty rest upon the court in passing
upon the plans proposed under Section 77B? The indications
are, to date, that the courts do not consider themselves under
such a duty The reason for this seems sound enough. The
object of a reorganization is to promote the pecuniary interests of the parties concerned, not to evolve a legally perfect
28 174 U. S. 683, 43 L. Ed. 1130; 228 U. S. 482, 57 L. Ed. 931, 289 U. S.
426, 77 L. Ed. 1300; 290 U. S. 504, 78 L. Ed. 465.
2935 Columbia Law Review 391, 549; 48 Harvard Law Review 39, 74.
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plan. The creditors and stockholders have an opportunity to
vote by classes as to whether they will accept the reorganization plan, and the required majorities are unlikely to accept
a Dlan unfair to the class as a whole. If the required majorities have accepted the plan proposed, the court should not
be too technical about its abstract fairness. A hint of this
attitude appears in the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of In re New Rochelle
Coal & Lumber Co.3 0 The opinion in that case says in part:
"It is argued that the appellee failed to make out its right to reorganization because it failed to offer some proof sustaining the fairness
of the plan. The appellant offered no proof or objection to the plan.
Counsel engaged in oral argument before the court. The outstanding
fact, however, is that the proponents of the plan met all the requirements as to proof by showing the requisite number of creditors, stockholders, and bondholders who consented to the plan. * * *
Our attention is called to National Surety Co. v Coriell, 289 U S.
426, 53 S. Ct. 678, 77 L. Ed. 1300, 88 A. L. R. 1231, where the court,
in an equity receivership case, remanded to the District Court for
further proceedings the matter of reorganization, and criticized the
terms of the organization in equity receivership there provided for. A
reorganization under Sec. 77B (11 USCA Sec. 207) is statutory, and
where there has been compliance with the terms prescribed in the statute, it is sufficient." (77 Fed. (2d) at 883, Italics ours.)
A similar point of view has been expressed by the English
Court of Appeals under the Act of Parliament known as the
Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act. In the case of
In re English, Scottish and Australian CharteredBank, 3 1 Lord
justice Lindley said
"If the creditors are acting on sufficient information and with time
to consider what they are about, and are acting honestly, they are, I
apprehend, much better judges of what is to their commercial advantage than the Court can be."
There are instances, however, where sufficient votes of all
classes may be in favor of a reorganization plan and yet it
3077 Fed. (2d)

881.
3 Ch. 385, 4d9; cf. the discussion of the Circuit Court of Appeals
of the Seventh Circuit in an equity reorganization case. Jameson v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 20 Fed. (2d) 803, cert. den. 275 U. S. 569.
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must be denied for want of equity Thus, where a plan calk
for the release by the noteholders of the debtor corporation
of their tort claims against the investment bankers for fraud
in the sale of the notes to the public, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to approve the plan
because calling for the release of claims which were not
against the debtor corporation and which, therefore, the court
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had no jurisdiction to alter.
In general, however, it may be safely assumed that in the

absence of flagrant unfairness, or lack of jurisdiction, the
courts will be strongly inclined to approve reorganization
plans which have met with the approval of all classes of
creditors and stockholders.
After approval of the plan, there remains the preparation,
execution and delivery of the instruments of conveyance,
contracts, or other documents necessary to vest title in a
successor corporation, if that method is adopted in the plan,
or the exchange of securities if the original corporation is to
continue in existence in altered form. The exemption of
such securities from the provisions of the Federal Securities
Act of 1933 is beyond the scope of this paper.
(E)

SUGGESTIONS AS TO POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS
IN THE ACT

It is impossible to refrain from making two obvious suggestions for procedural improvement in Section 77B. Since
most Federal Courts are much too busy to rule upon the
many details connected with a corporate reorganization, the
cases are referred to a Special Master, and subsection (c) 11
specifically authorizes the courts to appoint a Referee as
Special Master. In such a case, the Special Master has only
those powers given him under the equity rules. He must
report to the court on the allowance of claims, on the rejection
or adoption of executory contracts and leases, on the fairness
of reorganization plans, etc. Often as many as seven or
eight Special Master's reports will be found in a single re31 In re 1775 Broadway Corporation, 79 Fed. (2d)
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organization. Each of these reports must remain on file for
a period of twenty days before it is ruled on by the District
Judge. This results in delays which are often costly to the
parties in interest. It is suggested that the Section be amended
to give Special Masters appointed under it the same powers
which a Referee in Bankruptcy possesses under Sections 38
and 39 of the Bankruptcy Act, with such limitations and additions as would be appropriate. The District Judge may very
properly be given the exclusive power to pass upon the fairness of the plan, but certainly a Special Master with the
powers of the Referee could save a great deal of time in
passing upon all preliminary matters such as claims, making
orders with respect to the rejection or adoption of leases,
and the like.
The second suggestion is that the provisions of the Act
prescribing the method by which an unsuccessful reorganization proceeding is changed promptly into a liquidation proceeding be made more specific. To state the matter mildly,
there is some ambiguity when subsections (c) 8, (c) 1 and (k)
are considered together. Whether it is necessary to have the
creditors select a liquidating trustee, or whether the trustee
who has been in charge of the property during reorganization
proceedings can simply be continued as such by the court is a
matter which certainly should be clarified.

